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Does war still exist according to international law? On the one hand, the answer is 
obviously in the affirmative – hostilities including the use of force between states do take 
place and rules of international law regulating them do exist. Less obvious, however, is 
whether a state of war as a condition creating legal consequences not only for the parties 
involved, but also for other states, is still legally relevant. While there have been many 
conflicts since 1945, few of them have been characterized as „war‟ and no declarations of 
war have been made.
1
 Hence, there is a tendency to avoid the term „war‟ on the ground that 
it is „arcane‟ and largely superseded by the term „international armed conflict‟.
2
  Moreover, 
it has been claimed that a state of war is incompatible with the UN Charter and therefore 
can no longer exist under international law so that a qualification of a conflict as „war‟ as 
opposed to „armed conflict‟ would have no legal consequences.
3
 
This dissertation will examine whether the concept of war is still relevant and 
necessary despite the introduction of the modern concept of international armed conflict. In 
the course of answering it, three further questions need to be posed. First, is it compatible 
with the UN Charter to continue to invoke the concept of „war‟? Second, what are the 
consequences of recognizing a state of war as a contemporary legal concept? Finally, are 
there any norms in international law which are applicable in a state of war only?
4
 
War gives rise to, modifies or suspends certain rights and duties between 
belligerents and neutral states and affects both their nationals and trade. In addition, 
although not relevant to the issues discussed in this dissertation, war activates important  
 
                                                          
1
 C Greenwood „The Concept of War in Modern International Law‟, in: Greenwood, C Essays on War in 
International Law (2006) London: Cameron May, 33-60 at 33. 
2
 Y Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defence 4
th
ed (2005) Cambridge University Press, at xii (From the 
introduction to the first edition). 
3
 Greenwood (note 1) at 33. 
4
 Cf KJ Partsch „Armed Conflict‟ in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, band 3: Use of 

















rules of municpal law of every state.
5
 Nonetheless, there is no explicit definition of war, 
even though international instruments such as the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
the Kellog-Briand Pact make provisions regarding „war‟.
6
 
The first chapter addresses the complex topic of defining war. The efforts to 
interdict war will be discussed as well.  
The second chapter will discuss whether the state of war is permissible under 
contemporary international law. It will be argued that war continues to be recognized as a 
legal concept under modern international law.  
The third chapter will examine whether classifying a particular conflict as „war‟ has 
any legal significance and the practical relevance of this issue. It has been claimed that 
important bodies of international law such as the law of neutrality depend on the existence 
of a state of war.
7
 In addition, the discussion about the significance of a state of war 
necessarily includes the questions about the use and threat of force in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter which are of fundamental importance.
8
 




                                                          
5
 As found in Ertel Bieber and Co v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] AC 260 by the House of Lords, no subject is 
allowed to enter into a contract and to do anything which may be detrimental to the interests of his country. 
The continued existence of contractual relations with a subject of an alien state is assumed to be beneficial for 
the enemy state‟s trade and commerce and hence deemed to be of detrimental character. – ibid at 273-274 and 
277. 
6
 J Stone Legal Controls of International Conflict (1959) London at 304. 
7
 L Oppenheim International Law: A Treatise 7
th
ed (1948) Lauterpacht, H (ed) London: Longmans at 655, § 
295. 
8

















II. Chapter I: definition of war and legal instruments limiting the recourse to war 
It is undoubtedly hard for a layman to understand that not every case of fighting is „war‟ in 
the legal sense. Legal thinking, however, found it difficult if not impossible, to establish a 
legal definition of war.
9
 Hence, there is no binding definition of war set out in any 
international legal instrument. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
attempts to define war will be examined.  
1. Definition of war 
There have been numerous scholarly attempts to depict the practice of states and to 
articulate the immensely complex idea of war.
10
 
According to Oppenheim, „[w]ar is a contention between two or more states 
through their armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing 
conditions of peace according to the victor‟s wish.‟
11
 
However, this definition has several flaws. First, it does not cover two types of war: 
states that do not share a common border may declare war and apply the laws of war 
without being engaged in actual hostilities, ie without bringing a contention between their 
armed forces.  It is further possible that a state, although being at war with another state, 
may decide to withdraw its forces and then there will be no further contention between the 
armed forces.
12
 Second, the definition does not differentiate between war and status 
mixtus
13
. States might engage their armed forces in a contention, but might not be willing 
to declare war. In this case and according to this definition, these states would then either 
                                                          
9
 AK Kuhn „Should International Law Recognise an Intermediate Status between War and Peace?‟ (1954) 48 
American Journal of International Law 98 at 98-99. 
10
 Dinstein (note 2) at 4-5. 
11
 Oppenheim (note 7) at 202 (§ 54). However, it has been argued by Detter that the last few words of 
Oppenheim‟s definition indicate that it must be obsolete because a victor is no longer free to impose any 
conditions that he wishes. Moreover, Deter alleges that the concept of war could not depend on its 
consequences. – I Detter The Law of War (2000) Cambridge University Press at 7. 
12
 G Schwarzenberger The Frontiers of International Law (1962) London: Stevens at 249. 
13
 The term „status mixtus‟ refers to an intermediate status between war and peace – Dinstein (note 2) at 15; 

















be in a state of war against their will or the subjective element of animus belligerendi
14
 
must be introduced into the definition.
15
 
According to Kelsen, the intention of waging war in order to impose conditions of 
peace upon the attacked state should not be inserted into the definition of war.
16
 The 
attacked state will most probably only have the intention to defend itself and the war might 
end without the one belligerent obtaining victory over the other. For instance, in maritime 
war a belligerent may limit its military actions to mere coast defence and although these 
actions would satisfy the requirements of a state of war within the meaning of international 
law, they may be carried out with the intention of exhausting the enemy and not reaching 
victory over him.
17
 In any event, war might be terminated without the conclusion of a 
peace treaty.
18
 There have been cases where a peace treaty could not be concluded either 
because one of the belligerents ceased to exist as a result of the war or because its territory 




These issues highlight the main problems of any attempt to define war. Next, an 
examination of the different standpoints of a definition of war from a more historic 
perspective will be undertaken.   
War has been under consideration since time immemorial. As a form of self-help, it 
served both as a means for enforcement of the law in the form of a sanction against a 
                                                          
14
 Animus belligerendi  refers to the intention to wage war – K Skubiszewski „Peace and War‟ in: Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, band 4: Use of Force War and Neutrality Peace Treaties (N-Z), 
(1982) Amsterdam, New York: North-Holland, 74-78 at 75. 
15
 Schwarzenberger (note 12) at 249. 
16




 As was the case on 2 July 1921 when the Congress of the United States issued a resolution stating that „the 
state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by 
the joint resolution of Congress approved 6 April 1917, is hereby declared at an end.‟ This resolution was 
approved by the President on 2 July 1921. Similarly, on 19 October 1951 the state of war between the United 
States and Germany, which came into existence by the joint resolution of 11 December 1941, was declared 
terminated.  – as cited in Kelsen (note 16) at 68 and 69 respectively. 
19

















wrong and as a means of changing the law.
20
 Before World War I, the definition of war 
was based on a factual manifestation including the use of force with the objective to 
impose one‟s will on one‟s opponent and overpower them.
21
 However, after 1919 not all 
„wars‟ conformed to this definition. For example, post-World War I „wars‟ did not 
necessarily include armed force. Although war was declared between the Latin American 
states and the German Reich in World War II, no active hostilities took place.
22
 In addition, 
cases occurred where confiscation of enemy property, occupation or economic warfare 
continued even after the cessation of hostilities.
23
 Therefore, the classical definition of war 
– if such existed – was no longer able to distinguish war from other hostile measures short 
of war such as blockade or punitive action.
24
 
Two main schools of thought can be distinguished. The subjective school 
emphasized the intention of the states in conflict. A core notion of the subjective school 
(also called „state of war doctrine‟
25
) was the intention to wage war (animus belligerendi).
26
 
Hence, war existed if one of the parties decided to regard the situation as war.
27
 The 
intention or animus belligerendi could be manifested by a declaration of war or inferred 
from the circumstances. At least one of the parties to the conflict had to regard the situation 
as war. If all parties refused to consider the fighting as war, it could not be deemed to be 
war under international law.
28
 The attitude of third states was, however, not decisive.
29
 
This view is best summarized by Lord McNair: 
                                                          
20
 W Meng „War‟ in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, band 4: Use of Force War and 
Neutrality Peace Treaties (N-Z), (1982) Amsterdam, New York: North-Holland, 282-290 at 282. 
21








 JA Cohan „Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End?‟ (2003-2004) 27 Hastings 
International & Comparative Law Review 221 at 254. 
26
 Skubiszewski (note 14) at 75-76. 
27
 Greenwood (note 1) at 36. 
28



















A state of war arises in International Law (a) at the moment, if any, specified in a 
declaration of war; or (b) if none is specified, then immediately upon the 
communication of a declaration of war; or (c) upon the commission of an act of 
force, under the authority of a State, which is done animobelligerendi, or which, 
being done sine animobelligerendi but by way of reprisals or intervention, the other 
State elects to regard as creating a state of war, either by repelling force by force 
or in some other way; retroactive effect being given to this election, so that the state 
of war arises on the commission of the first act of force.
30
 
In contrast to the subjective school of thought, the proponents of the objective 
school relied on a definition based on objective criteria
31
 and hence de-emphasized the 
subjective view of the participants. In the words of Professor Kelsen: 
A state of war in the true and full sense of the term is brought about only by acts of 
war, that is to say, by the use of armed force... Consequently war is a specific 
action, not a status. From the point of view of international law, the most important 
fact is the resort to war, and that means resort to an action, not resort to a status. 
Some writers consider the intention to make war, the animus belligerendi, of the 
state or states involved in war as essential. Animus belligerendi means the intention 
to wage war. But this can only be the intention to perform acts of war, that is to say, 




Others have proposed a hybrid construction of war using elements from both the 
„objective‟ and „subjective‟ theories. In their view, even though animus belligerendi is 
necessary for a „state of war‟ to commence, 
…if acts of force are sufficiently serious and long continued, then, even if both 
sides disclaim any animus belligerendi and refuse to admit that a state of war has 
arisen between them, there comes a point at which the law must say to the parties, 
you are refusing to recognize the facts; your actions are of a kind which it is the 
policy of the law to characterize as war; and therefore, whatever you choose to say 




                                                          
30
 „The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation of War to Reprisals,‟ 11 Grotius Society Transactions 29 at 
45 (1925) – as cited in MS McDougal & FP Feliciano „The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal 
Analysis‟ (1958) 52 American Journal of International Law 241 at 242. 
31
 Greenwood (note 1) at 36. 
32
 Kelsen (note 16) at 27. 
33

















Neither approach offers a satisfactory definition. On the one hand, the subjective 
test made the application of the rules of international law applicable solely in war times 
(such as the law of neutrality) dependent on the choice of the states concerned. Moreover, 
the subjective school led to an artificial separation between the state of war as a legal 
concept and the factual state of war in the sense of actual fighting.
34
 
On the other hand, the objective approach lacked established criteria to distinguish 
a state of war from other hostilities falling short of war due to the fact that there was no 
definition of war that was agreed upon by states and writers.
35
 In addition, in the period 
between 1919 and 1945, no definition of war could be reconciled with state practice,
36
 and 
declarations of war became a rarity.
37
 Hence, even before 1945, there was no agreed 
definition of war.  
Some scholars tried a different approach in the attempt to clarify the term „war‟. For 
instance, F Grob
38
 rejected the notions of both a „war in the legal sense‟ and a „legal state 
of war‟ and suggested that not „one over-all legal definition of war‟ is needed but rather a 
„variety of legal definitions‟. Each of them should be formulated in relation to „the 
particular intent and purpose‟ of the specific „rule of law on war‟ which happens to be 
under consideration at a given time. Hence, in this view, in order to determine whether a 
particular exercise of coercion amounts to „war‟ one must specify a particular rule of law in 
relation to which the „existence of war‟ will be affirmed or denied.
39
 Whether a specific 
rule is applicable to the facts or not, depends on the rule‟s intent and purposes and is 
decided by interpretation. Thus, the main task in determining whether or not war exists is 
reduced to the „interpretation‟ of legal technicality.
40
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 As cited in McDougal & Feliciano (note 30) at 244. 
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This would lead to the determination of war in relation to a particular set of rules 
only, whereas it might not exist in relation to other rules. Hence, the effect of this 
„relativist‟ approach would be that war would have different meanings for every situation
41
 
and thus, the concept of war would be destroyed altogether.
42
 In addition, the term „war‟ 
would become meaningless for legal purposes and the forms of armed violence between 
states even more diverse.
43
 
Thus, there is a complete lack of agreement with regard to a definition of war. For 
this reason, it has been suggested that no definition „serviceable for all purposes‟ can be 
established.
44
 Despite the lack of unanimity with respect to the meaning of the term „war‟, 
a discussion of a „definition of war‟ is a valuable aid to more effective regulation of this 
legal concept. The fact that there is no agreement on an exact definition is not necessarily 
an impediment to articulating legal norms regulating the resort to armed force.
45
 
Hence, numerous attempts have been made to restrict the right to wage war or to 
abolish the legal state of war altogether.  
2. First attempts to limit the right to recourse to war 
The quest to restrict recourse to war by international law is a twentieth century 
phenomenon.
46
 Prior to 1919, it was held that war was an exercise of state sovereignty, and 
therefore could be invoked by states at will.
47
 
                                                          
41
 McNair contended that each separate use of the term „war‟ required its own definition in the light of its 
particular purpose. - as quoted in Dalmia Cement Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan at 620; see also F Grob 
„The Relativity of War and Peace‟ 189 (1949) as cited in Dinstein (note 2) at 15. 
42




 F Grob „The Relativity of War and Peace‟ 189 (1949) as cited in Dinstein (note 2) at 15. 
45
 Arguments by I Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) Oxford: Clarendon 
Press at 357 with regard to a definition of aggression. 
46
 JG Merrills Anatomy of International Law: A Study of the Role of International Law in the Contemporary 



















a) Hague Conventions II and III 
The first indication in the 20
th
 century to limit the right to resort to force in international 
relations was in the Hague Conventions II and III of 1907.
48
 The second Hague Convention 
on the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts
49
 of 1907, also 
called the Porter Convention after the American delegate who introduced it
50
, represents 
the beginning of the attempts to limit the right of waging war as a legal instrument and as a 
legally recognized means of changing legal rights.
51
 
This convention codified the Drago Doctrine (named after an Argentine Foreign 
Minister) stating that a public debt cannot be used to justify an armed intervention.
52
 
However, the scope of the limitation on freedom of war imposed by this convention was 
very narrow. War was still permissible in the case that the debtor state refused to go to 
arbitration or to abide by the results from an arbitration process. The Convention was 
confined to contractual debts of foreign nationals who were represented by their 
governments and did not include inter-governmental loans.
53
 
In addition, article 1 of the third Hague Convention relative to the Opening of 
Hostilities
54
 required „previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of 
war […] or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war‟ prior to the waging of 
hostilities.  
                                                          
48
 CD Wallace „Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)‟ in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, band 
3: Use of Force War and Neutrality Peace Treaties (A-M), (1982) Amsterdam, New York: North-Holland, 
236-239 at 236. 
49
 (Hague, II); signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague072.asp (accessed 6 December 2011). 
50
 Dinstein (note 2) at 79. 
51
 Oppenheim (note 7) at 179 (§ 52 et seq).  
52
 S Rosenne The Perplexities of Modern International Law (2004) Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff at 119; 
Dinstein (note 2) at 79. 
53
 Dinstein (note 2) at 79. 
54
 Convention (III) relative to the Opening of Hostilities, The Hague, 18 October 1907, available at 

















b) Covenant of the League of Nations55 
The preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations admonished member states „not to 
resort to war‟. The nearest the Covenant came to an abolition of war, however, was in 
article 10, which obliged member states to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and 
political independence of all members of the League against external aggression.
56
 
Combined with the preamble, article 10 could be construed as amounting to an obligation 
not to resort to war.
57
 Moreover, article 11 (1) stated that any war or threat of war was a 
matter of concern of the whole League and included the idea of collective security. 
However, other provisions undermined the purported ban on war.
58
 Article 12 
imposed merely a procedural delay by stipulating that 
[t]he Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any 
dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration 
or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three 
months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. 
Article 15 obliged states to submit all disputes to the Council which could make 
recommendations for the settlement of the dispute
59
. According to article 15 (6), member 
states would not go to war with any party to the dispute which complied with the 
recommendations issued in a report by the Council. Waging war against a party which did 
not adhere to the recommendation was, however, not excluded.
60
 Moreover, should the 
Council‟s report not be unanimous, article 15 (7) reserved the right of members of the 
League „to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right 
                                                          
55
 League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8b9854.html (accessed 12 December 2011). 
56
 Wallace (note 48) at 236-237. 
57




 Art 15 (4) Covenant of the League of Nations. 
60





















Hence, articles 12 and 15 preserved the right of states to go to war and merely 
imposed some procedural requirements.
62
 The prohibition stipulated in article 10 was thus 
„totally undermined‟
63
. This was further affirmed by article 16 (1) which provided that, 
should any member of the League resort to war in contravention of articles 12, 13 and 15, it 
would ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of 
the League.
64
 A breach of article 10 was not included in article 16 (1).  
Furthermore, the statement in article 16 (1) is arguably „nothing but a legal 
fiction‟
65
, which does not add anything to the obligation to undertake the sanctions listed in 
the same article.
66
 And under article 16 (2), there was no obligation for the member states 
to resort to military action; the Council had only a power to make recommendations in this 
regard, which were not binding.
67
 
Hence, waging war seemed to be simply a question of procedural formalities. The 
Covenant of the League of Nations obliged states not to resort to war as long as the dispute 
was being considered by the League Council, but in the case of a failure of the Council to 
produce a settlement, the member states were entitled to take any action that they 
considered necessary. No provision in the Covenant imposed a substantive prohibition of 
                                                          
61
 Art 15 (8) Covenant of the League of Nations. 
62




 Rosenne (note 52) at 120. 
65
 Kelsen (note 16) at 41. 
66
 These obligations include the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse 
between the own and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, 
commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the state which is in breach of the Covenant and 
the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not – art 16 (1) Covenant of the League 
of Nations.  
67



















 Furthermore, the Covenant did not provide any adequate institutional mechanisms 
for the maintenance of peace and imposed only weak obligations on member states.
69
 
In addition, the Covenant lacked an authoritative machinery for determining breaches 
permitting states a wide discretion to determine when they were engaging in hostilities.
70
 
Accordingly, the Covenant of the League of Nations merely tried to control the use of force 
and the right to go to war, but did not prohibit the recourse to war.
71
 
c) Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and Locarno 
Treaty 
The first efforts to completely ban the resort to war were made in the early years of the 
League of Nations.
72
 In particular, the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes was adopted by the League during its 5
th
 General Assembly on 2 
October 1924
73
.  However, Britain failed to ratify the Protocol, so that it never came into 
force.  
The Treaty of Locarno
74
 also attempted to restrict war-making.
75
 In article 2, Germany 
and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertook in no case to attack or 
                                                          
68
 McCoubrey & White (note 57) at 21; Kelsen  (note 16) at 39. 
69
 HU Scupin „Peace, Historical Movements Towards‟ in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, band 4: Use of Force War and Neutrality Peace Treaties (N-Z), (1982) Amsterdam, New York: North-
Holland, 78-86 at 84. 
70
 Stone (note 6) at 300. 
71
 Rosenne (note 52) at 119. 
72
 Wallace (note 48) at 237. 
73
 League of Nations, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 2 October 1924, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40421a204.html (accessed 12 December 12, 2011). Articles 2, art 
4(6), 8, 10, 16 make reference to resort to war. 
74
 Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925, Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference 
of the same Date and Collective Note to Germany dated London, 1 December 1925, regarding Article 16 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2054/volume-I-1292-English.pdf (accessed 12 
December 2011). 
75
 TM Franck Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002) Cambridge 

















invade each other or resort to war against each other.
76
 More significantly, all contracting 
parties
77
 were obliged to provide immediate help to a party against which „a flagrant 
violation of Article 2 of the Treaty or of a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty 
of Versailles‟ has been directed by one of the contracting parties.
78
 However, Germany 
withdrew from the Pact in 1936.
79
 
The influence of the regime created by the League was further undermined by the 
failure of the United States to become a member, the late joining of the Soviet Union in 
1934, and Germany, Italy and Japan withdrawing from it, in 1933 and 1937 respectively. 




d) Kellogg-Briand Pact 
Nevertheless, during the heyday of the League, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact (also 
called Pact of Paris)
81
 was signed, which made the first attempt to outlaw altogether 
recourse to war as an instrument of national policy.
82
 Prior to the Pact of Paris, war was 
admissible as a regular legal institution.
83
 The Kellogg-Briand-Pact amended this state of 
law and rendered the resort to war as a legal remedy or a method of changing the law 
illegal. War was no longer a discretionary right of the states parties to the Pact.
84
 
In particular, article 1 of the Pact of Paris stated that the „parties condemn the 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an 
                                                          
76
 Art 2 of the Locarno Treaty. 
77
 Germany, Belgium, France, Britain and Italy. 
78
 Art 4 (3) of the Locarno Treaty. 
79
 Franck (note 75) at 11. 
80
 Rosenne (note 52) at 120. 
81
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instrument of national policy in their relations with one another‟. War as an instrument of 
national policy referred to any war which was not started in self-defence or on behalf of the 
international community.
85
 The renunciation of this type of war included two aspects – war 
as a legal instrument of self-help against an international wrong and war as an act of 
national sovereignty aimed at the change of existing rights.
86
 
The prohibition of war under the Kellogg-Briand Pact went further than the one under 
the Covenant of the League of Nations.
87
 However, the Pact of Paris, like the Covenant, did 
not abolish the institution of war entirely.
88
 Resort to war remained lawful in cases of self-
defence, between signatories and non-signatories, against a signatory who had violated the 
Pact by resorting to war against its provisions and as a measure of collective action for the 
enforcement of existing obligations under other international instruments.
89
 In addition, the 
Pact lacked any sanction mechanisms.
90
 The preamble merely established that a state 
violating the Pact „should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty‟. The Kellogg-
Briand Pact can thus not be considered as imposing a ban on war.
91
 
In addition, because only war was condemned, but there was no agreed definition of 
war, states could engage in hostilities under some other name.
92
 This was the case in the 
Manchurian Affair (1931-32), the Italo-Ethiopian Affair (1935) and the Sino-Japanese 
Hostilities (1937-41).
93
 The aim of waging a „war in disguise‟ served to evade the duty to 
refrain from war as established by the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter, and escape 
the condemnation of being the aggressor state.
94
 As a result of the prohibition on the use of 
force in article 2 (4), after World War II states moved away from the traditional concept of 
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war characterized by a formal declaration of war and a clear intent to engage in military 
action with another state, towards armed conflicts under the guise of police actions
95
, 
limited acts of self-defence or humanitarian intervention not being referred to as war.
96
 
Moreover, the Pact of Paris did not prohibit all wars: defensive wars were still 
allowed.
97
 Therefore, it did not abolish the institution of war. Hence, even after the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact war was still possible under international law.  
e) Further international instruments 
Other examples of efforts to interdict war can be found in article 2 of the inter-American 
Saavedra Lamas Treaty
98
 forbidding the settlement of territorial questions by violence, and 
stating that member states would not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not 
obtained by pacific means, nor any occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by 
force of arms.
99
 It did not provide any sanctions. In the case of non-compliance, the parties 
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committed themselves to „make every effort for the maintenance of peace‟.
100
 This treaty 
was replaced by the Bogotà Pact of 1948.
101
 
Similarly, article 11 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States
102
 provided an obligation for the contracting states „not to recognize territorial 
acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists 
in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other 
effective coercive measure‟. 
Furthermore, the Declaration of Lima concerning the non-recognition of the 
acquisition of territory by the use of force
103
 demonstrated as  
a fundamental principle of the Public Law of America, that the occupation or 
acquisition of territory or any other modification or territorial or boundary 
arrangement obtained through conquest by force or by non-pacific means shall not 
be valid or have legal effect.  
The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of 
Peace
104
 with the Additional Protocol relevant to Non-intervention confirmed that „no State 
has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another‟ one.
105
 For this 
purpose, article I prohibited the direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of another 
party. This constituted an absolute agreement on non-intervention.
106
A significant aspect of 
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the Protocol was the absence of an American reservation, whereas a reservation was issued 
with regard to the Montevideo Convention.
107
 This Protocol was regarded as the 
unequivocal renunciation by the United States of any intervention not aiming to protect 
lives and property of nationals.
108
 
Moreover, the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of 
Aggression from 1939
109
 stipulated in article 4 (2) that situations created by an aggressor‟s 
use of armed force did not have any effect on sovereignty or other legal rights over 
territory. 
However, despite the fact that numerous international instruments have been 
concluded and international organizations or institutes have passed several resolutions and 
(draft) conventions, war was not abolished by any of them. The instruments constituted 
„evidence of general practice accepted as law‟
110
. State practice between 1920 and 1945 
showed that illegal resort to force as an instrument of national policy except for in the case 
of self-defence was condemned. In the few cases, where the rule was violated
111
, it was 
usually alleged that no violation had occurred or justifications of the invasions have been 
made.
112
 The state practice showed awareness of the legal nature of the stipulated 
obligations and could find further support in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Saavedra 
Lamas Pact. The four states not parties to the former – Bolivia, El Salvador, Uruguay and 
Argentina – were bound by the latter. Hence, with regard to the illegal use of force there 
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was a constant and repeated practice accompanied by a sense of legal obligation
113
 which 
amounted to a customary rule of international law.
114
 However, as will be argued in 
Chapter II, war and illegal use of force are not necessarily synonymous concepts. Thus, 
there was no customary rule on the prohibition of all cases of war, nor was there a general 
agreement on the precise meaning of the term. On the contrary, certain degree of 
controversy in the deployment of the term in state practice was observed.  
III. Chapter II: is war illegal? 
1. UN Charter 
War might well have been abolished with the adoption of the UN Charter
115
. Article 2 (4) 
states that „[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.‟ 
The UN Charter goes beyond the Kellogg-Briand Pact and forbids not only the right 
to go to war but also right to resort to force
116
 except for in instances of article 51 and 
Chapter VII. Hence, according to the UN Charter, war is forbidden as a use of force against 
another state.
117
 However, the Charter avoids references to the term „war‟ altogether.
118
 
Merely the Preamble mentions as one of the purposes of the United Nations „to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war‟. 
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The UN Charter imposes upon member states also an obligation to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means.
119
Additionally, it stipulates a positive duty for states to submit 




The Charter permits the use of force only in self-defense
121
 and as a UN 
enforcement action
122
. The logical consequence of this is that war in the sense of both 
parties to a dispute being entitled to lawfully use force is no longer possible. According to 
the Charter, one party would necessarily use force unlawfully.
123
 By implication, no 




a) War as an extra-legal phenomenon 
For centuries, war has been compared with natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions and expected to appear, like plagues, floods or fires in cyclical 
frequency.
125
 Hence, it has been assumed that similarly to droughts and thunderbolts which 
cannot be forbidden, war cannot be interdicted by international law. Moreover, war has 
been seen as being „outside the range and control of law‟, therefore neither legal nor 
illegal
126
 or as a „category of events […] incapable of legal control but entailing legal 
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. It has been suggested furthermore that „[i]nternational law has […] no 
alternative but to accept war‟.
128
 
These views are based on the presumption that while it is possible to have rules 
governing the conduct of war (jus in bello), it is impossible to impose normative limitations 
on the unleashing of hostilities, so that there cannot be any real jus ad bellum.
129
 
International law cannot say when, but only how war is to be waged.
130
 
However, the assumption that war is „a meta-juridical occurrence‟ is „artificial‟ and 
„delusive‟.
131
After all, war is not caused by nature, but by human beings. According to 
Dinstein, every form of human conduct is susceptible of regulation by legal norms and 
cannot be a priori excluded from the range of application of any actual or potential legal 
rules. The fact that international law is able to control the conduct of combatants (jus in 
bello) shows that it can also restrict the freedom of belligerents to wage war (jus ad 
bellum).
132
 Yet, from a jurisprudential point of view, is there any difference between 
imposing rules on the „when‟ or „how‟ of war?
133
 
Certainly, as Lauterpacht observes, international law does not establish war.
134
 
Likewise, domestic law does not establish murder or robbery.
135
 However, there is a greater 
similarity between war and murder or robbery, all being forms of human conduct, than 
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between war and droughts or floods. Murder and robbery can be forbidden by domestic 
law; similarly, war can be interdicted by international law.
136
 
The fact that war was for a long time a legitimate tool of national policy only means 
that during this time war was permitted and not that international law has a somehow 
inherent obstacle in its ability to pose a ban on the recourse to war.
137
 Thus, war can be 
legal or illegal, but it cannot be extra-legal.
138
 
b) Is the concept of war compatible with the UN Charter? 
Can a state of war be lawfully brought into existence under the UN Charter? Article 2 (4) 
prohibits the use and even the threat of force. Hence, any declaration of war, which implies 
a threat, even if it is not followed by armed hostilities, would violate this provision.
139
A 
declaration of war would at the very least amount to a breach of the peace within the 
meaning of article 39 UN Charter.
140
  
c) Definitions and language issues 
Whenever the abolition of war or its illegality with respect of article 2 (4) is discussed, 
three terms are mainly used: war as a legal concept has become „obsolete‟
141
, that it is 
„irrelevant‟
142
 for the contemporary international law or that it has been made 
„redundant‟
143
 by the UN Charter. However, one should approach the use of these terms 
with caution. 
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The term „obsolete‟ used with respect to war implies that „war‟ as a term is no 
longer practiced or used or that it is out of date.
144
 It comes from the Latin „obsolētus‟, 
which is the past participle of „obsolēscěre‟ meaning „to grow old, to fall into disuse‟.  
The term „redundant‟ means superfluous or excessive.
145
And finally, „irrelevant‟ 
refers to being not relevant or pertinent to the case; not to the purpose or to something 
which does not apply.
146
 
Applied to the present topic, this would mean that „war‟ as a concept is no longer in use 
(obsolete), is superfluous and exceeding what is necessary (redundant) because of the UN 
Charter, and not important, pertinent, or germane (irrelevant) to international law. 
It will be argued that none of these contentions are true. Because terms have different 
meanings in different contexts, one should be more cautious when using them.  
d) Theoretical observations 
An arguably radical school of thought suggests that since the UN Charter has come into 
force, war has become legally obsolete.
147
 States no longer have the „legal power‟ to 
declare war.
148
 If they nevertheless do so, this declaration would not be given any effect. 
While states may commit hostile acts against each other, these acts would constitute 
isolated incidents and not be part of a general condition of a state of war which puts aside 
the rules of peace.
149
 In the words of Hans Kelsen, „war is a specific action, not a status‟.
150
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This school of thought is premised on the subjective view of war.
151
 Implications of 
this line of thought include the proposition that belligerent rights, ie rights and legal 
privileges for states in war, are no longer applicable. Nor can the law of neutrality exist 
under contemporary international law.  
The radical theory is contested by the moderate or pragmatist approach.
152
 It is 
rooted in the objective school of thought about war.
153
 It claims that war cannot be merely 
abolished by a pronouncement. Any de facto use of armed forces would necessarily give 
rise to the laws of war as applicable between the belligerents and the laws of neutrality as 
relevant between the belligerents and the rest of the international community.
154
 This 




In this advisory opinion, when determining which law is applicable in order to 
answer the question posed by the General Assembly on the legality of threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, the ICJ found that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights
156
 did not cease in times of war
157
. Hence, the right not arbitrarily to be 
deprived of one‟s life stipulated in article 6 applied also during hostilities. However, the 
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test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life ought to be determined by the applicable lex 
specialis, namely, the law relevant in times of armed conflict.
158
 
Thus, the court referred to the lex specialis laws during armed conflict, which are 
different from the law applicable in peaceful times. This had been one of the most 
important characteristics of the old legal institution of war.
159
 
e) Is a declaration of war permissible under the UN Charter? 
Under the Charter regime, the pertinent question to ask is whether a declaration of 
war would be permissible as an act of self-defence by a state that has been attacked. 
There are three possible answers. First, a declaration of war as a response to an armed 
attack is permissible without any limitations. Second, it is permissible only if it is 
necessary and proportionate. And third, a declaration of war is always incompatible 
with the UN Charter.
160
 
The weak point of the first contention claiming that a declaration of war as a 
response to an armed attack is permissible without any limitations is that it ignores the 
principles of proportionality and necessity. The right to resort to force in self-defence is 
always subject to the restrictions of proportionality and necessity.
161
 If the recourse to force 
is not reasonably proportionate and necessary relative to the seriousness of the attack, it 
would violate the ius ad bellum
162
, the rules of international law governing the legality of 
the use of force by states.
163
 Hence, a state of war could only be created if this were a 
proportionate and necessary measure.
164
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Yet, it has been argued that this would hardly ever happen because it would be 
difficult for a declaration of war to be issued in self-defence and to fulfil the requirements 
of necessity and proportionality at the same time.
165
 However, it is not unthinkable that a 
declaration of war could be a necessary and proportionate measure of self-defence
166
, in 
some circumstances „[t]he right of self-defense is […] a right to resort to war‟.
167
 Thus, 
(even if it would occur only seldom) it is possible that a conflict might justify the resort to 
war in self-defence.  
There are several other arguments, however, asserting that a state of war is 
completely incompatible with the UN Charter. 
In the view of Elihu Lauterpacht,  
the prohibition of the use of force excludes the possibility of the creation of a 
technical condition of war; and […] the rights and duties of third parties in 
hostilities stem from their position as Members of the United Nations and not from 
a concept inextricably connected with a right to go to war now happily totally 
repudiated by the international community.
168
 
Next, it has been argued that war should be incompatible with the UN Charter on 
the ground that if an aggressor is allowed to create a state of war, he would acquire rights 
both against neutral countries and the victim state, and this would mean that the aggressor 
would benefit from its own w ongful act.
169
 However, this would also lead to armed forces 
of the aggressor state not being allowed to obtain status of prisoners of war and would not 
be protected by the other laws of war.
170
 As a consequence, jus in bello, the law that 
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regulates the actual conduct of hostilities once the use of force has begun, would become 
entirely subordinate to jus ad bellum.
171
 
In addition, this proposition can be challenged on humanitarian grounds.
172
 The 
Preamble to the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions from 1977 provides that the 
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protocol must be fully applied in all 
circumstances and to all persons protected by these instruments notwithstanding the nature 
or origin of the armed conflict or the causes given by the parties to the conflict.
173
 
However, it is widely accepted even by those arguing that an aggressor should not 
benefit from his wrongdoing that humanitarian law applies equally to all parties to a 
conflict.
174
 Thus, there is uncertainty only with regard to the application of the parts of the 
laws of war that are not based on humanitarian considerations, such as the law of 
neutrality
175
, whereas jus in bello remains applicable.
176
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 Finally, it has been claimed that SC Resolution 95 from 1 September 1951
177
 
underpins the proposition that a state of war is incompatible with the prohibition of threat 
or use of force in article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. However, the resolution merely provides 
that 
since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half 
years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is 
actively a belligerent or required to exercise a right of visit, search, and seizure for 
any legitimate purpose of self-defence. 
The basis for the resolution was the Egyptian-Israeli debate over the legality of 
Egypt‟s actions against shipping passing through the Suez Canal to or from Israel. Egypt 
alleged that the measures constituted a lawful exercise of belligerent rights claiming that 
Israel and Egypt were at war. Israel contended that there was never a state of war between 
the two countries or even if there had been, it ended by the armistice in place since 1949 
between the two countries.
178
 
The resolution was based on that armistice agreement, the rights of passage to the 
Suez Canal and the commencement of active hostilities since 1949.  Even if the resolution 
did provide support for the view that a state of war and the exercise of belligerent rights 
after active hostilities have been suspended are incompatible with the Charter, it does not 
deliver persuasive evidence that a state of war can exist in the event that hostilities are still 
taking place.
179
 The resolution is therefore not conclusive on the question whether a state of 
war can exist when the conflicting parties are still engaged in hostilities.
180
 
Another argument against the proposition which denies the possibility of war 
unconditionally is that an absolute incompatibility of a state of war with the UN Charter 
cannot be simply presumed. For example, the UN Charter itself permits certain forms of 
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use of force such as the legitimate self-defence in article 51 of the UN Charter and 
sanctions by the Security Council under Chapter VII.
181
 
Moreover, state practice shows that states still consider a state of war to be an 
operating legal concept.
182
 References to a state of war in international instruments such as 
common article 2 to all Geneva Conventions of 1949, article 18 of the Hague Convention 
of 1954 and article 3 of the Definition of Aggression
183
 confirm this state practice.    
f) Cases since World War II in which the state of war has been claimed 
Evidence that states still regard a state of war as legally possible is also provided by 
conflicts since 1945, in which some references to the state of war have been made. Some of 
the conflicts have been characterized as war either by the parties involved or by third states. 
i. Arab-Israeli conflict 
A state of war has been asserted in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
184
 Since 1948, the Arab States 
have consistently maintained that a state of war existed between them and Israel.
185
 There 
was, however, no formal declaration of war in the sense of the Third Hague Convention of 
1907 since this would have naturally amounted to a formal recognition of the state of 
Israel.
186
 Nevertheless, numerous statements were issued to different organs of the United 
Nations
187
 accompanied by actions which made clear the position of the Arab states that 
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they regard themselves as being at war or in a state of belligerency with Israel.
188
 In 
addition, rights of a belligerent against third states under the „traditional‟ law of war have 
been invoked, especially the law of prize.
189
 Thus, Egyptian courts took the view that the 
hostilities of 1948-49 amounted to a state of war between Egypt and Israel.
190
At that time, 
it was considered that only in the instance of an existing case of war could the rights of 
belligerents with respect to enemy or neutral ships and cargoes be exercised.
191
 
Moreover, the SC resolution of 22 November 1967
192
 stipulated as one of the 
requirements for peace in the Middle East the „termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency‟. While this might not have amounted to recognition of a state of war between 
the Arab States and Israel by the Security Council, it at least revealed an attitude towards a 
continued existence of a war as a legal condition.
193
 
ii. Korean War (1950-1953) 
Neither the individual States participating in the enforcement action nor the UN as a whole 
referred to the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 as war in the ordinary legal 
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sense of the term.
194
 On the contrary, it was expressly stated that the hostilities did not 
constitute war. However, at the same time, it was recognized that for some purposes, the 
hostilities would be treated as if they constituted war.
195
 As stated by Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, the Attorney-General, in the British House of Commons, on 20 November 
1950, the law of treason „is as applicable to such a conflict as it is to an ordinary war 
between State and State‟.
196
 Despite the fact that no declaration of war was issued, the 
applicability of the rules of warfare was not challenged. Rather, both sides formally 




iii. Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 
In this conflict, both Iran and Iraq claimed belligerent rights with regard to shipping in the 
Gulf. Furthermore, the UK government declared neutrality in the „war between Iraq and 
Iran‟. The Ambassador of Iraq to the UK declared that „[s]o far Iraq has not declared 
officially a state of war with Iran, but actual state of war does exist even though diplomatic 
representation continues between the two countries.‟
198
 Hence, there is some evidence that 
these hostilities were treated as war by the parties.
199
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iv. Hostilities between India and Pakistan 
The 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan was characterized as war by the 
latter.
200
 It claimed that on 6 September 1965, Indian troops crossed the boundary of 
Pakistan and attacked it. As a consequence, a declaration of war against India was made by 
the President of Pakistan. On 9 September 1965, the Government of Pakistan issued a 
proclamation as to war contraband.
201
 Similarly to the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, Pakistan 
insisted on a state of war for reasons of seizing enemy and neutral property.  As a result, 
Pakistan established a prize court whose operation was based on the assumption that there 
was a state of war between the two countries.
202
 In the case of Government of Pakistan v 
RSN and Others, the Pakistan High Court of Dacca found that „the claimants [RSN Co Ltd] 
have failed to make out that the goods in question are not enemy properties‟.
203
 However, 




In Dalmia Cement Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan
205
 the arbitrator found that 
where there was doubt as to the existence of a state of war between members of the UN, it 
must be presumed in dubio that each state intended to act in accordance with its obligations 
under the Charter and not to resort to force.
206
 Hence, he came to the conclusion that the 
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Indian-Pakistani conflict did not constitute war.
207
 However, the arbitral award was granted 
on the assumption that it was still possible in legal terms to create a state of war.
208
 
Despite the limitations in article 2 (4) UN Charter, the use of force by states has 
remained constant in international relations.
209
 Hence, state practice shows that states still 
consider war as a feature of international law
210
  and regard it as not per se incompatible 
with the UN Charter. 
2. Other justifications for the use of the term „war‟ 
a) Wars of national liberation 
During the decolonization period, attempts were made to justify the use of force by states 




Under traditional international law, wars of national liberation were regarded as 
civil wars and thus constituted a domestic affair.
212
 Hence, third states could not interfere in 
the internal affairs of another state and, therefore, could not aid the people in their battle.
213
 
However, the pre-eminence of decolonization since 1960 resulted in the passage of 
numerous resolutions by the GA
214
 with the result that such wars have come to be regarded 
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as international conflicts. In addition, article 1 of the first Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions
215
 defines in its paragraph 3 the scope of application of Additional 
Protocol I as conforming to common article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions. According 
to article 1 (4) of the Protocol „armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the 
right of self-determination‟ qualify as international conflicts.
216
  
Because article 2 (4) UN Charter prohibits the resort to force, several justifications 
for the legitimate use of force by liberation movements have been developed.  
Under article 51 of the UN Charter, a right of self-defence against colonial 
domination has been advocated on the ground that if peoples are deprived of their right of 
self-determination, they would be entitled to resort to force in order to enforce that right.
217
  
However, colonialism does not necessarily involve an imminent threat or use of force.
218
  
Another view argues that colonialism in itself constituted an aggression ab initio 
since in the past, colonial regimes used to be installed by force and as long as the effects of 
that attack remained, so did the initial aggression.
219
 However, this argument disregards 
both the fact that in the past forceful acquisition of land has been legal and that 
contemporary international norms cannot be applied retrospectively.
220
 Moreover, in the 
language of article 51 UN Charter, self-defence is allowed against an imminent attack, but 
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force which occurred many years ago is not imminent. Colonialism in itself does not 
amount to an imminent use of force or an armed attack.
221
 
A third theory attributes to liberation movements a right sui generis to use self-
defence which is deemed to arise from the condemnation of colonialism by the 
international community as expressed in instruments such as GA resolutions.
222
 This „new 
bellum justum theory‟ claims that wars of national liberation are not inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN Charter which supposedly includes „a basic principle‟ condemning all 
forms of colonialism since they are not directed against the territorial integrity of a state.
223
 




However, the UN Charter does not mention wars of national liberation as an 
exception to the prohibition of use of force. Allowing national liberation movements to 
employ force in attaining self-determination would weaken the general prohibition of use 
of force in article 2 (4) UN Charter and undermine the authority of the SC for the 
maintenance of peace and security.
225
 Moreover, the concept is open to abuse as long as 
there is no general agreement in the international community on an exact definition of self-
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Nevertheless, the UN GA Resolution on Friendly Relations
228
 and article 7 of the 
Definition of Aggression
229
 make an important step in legitimizing the resort to armed 
violence by liberation movements.  
In particular, GA Resolution on Friendly Relations imposed a duty on every state to 
refrain from any forcible action which would deprive peoples of their right to self-
determination, freedom and independence. Furthermore, every state is obliged to promote 
the realization of the principle of self-determination of peoples in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter and to provide the United Nations with assistance in 
implementing this principle. 
In addition, article 7 of the Definition of Aggression states that 
Nothing in this Definition … could in any way prejudice the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples 
forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under 
colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of 
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned 
Declaration. 
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Both international instruments refer only to peoples who had been forcibly denied the 
exercise of their right to self-determination and to the respective action against that forcible 
denial.
230
 However, the term „struggle‟ is ambiguous – it can mean either armed struggle or 
peaceful struggle.
231
 Hence, the exact nature of the struggle or resistance remains uncertain. 
Furthermore, GA resolutions lack a consistent opinio juris of states with regard to 
whether peoples may assert their right to external self-determination by means of force.
232
 
For example, Resolution 2105 recognizing the legitimacy of the struggles of liberation 
movements
233
 was not adopted unanimously as was Resolution 1514 (XV)
234
 but rather 
faced the continuous resistance by Western states.
235
 Hence, the GA resolutions in question 
did not create legally binding rules.
236
 In addition, more recent resolutions
237
 do not 
mention the right to self-determination and the legitimacy of the struggle for self-
determination of national liberation movements, because it would legitimize groups 
considered terrorists by some states. Instead, these resolutions condemn terrorist acts 




A key issue associated with the right to use force by national liberation movements is 
whether a third state can intervene actively in overthrowing the colonial power.
239
 GA 
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resolutions call on states to provide all forms of moral and material assistance.
240
 For 
instance, GA Resolutions 3070
241
  invites all states to provide „in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations and with relevant resolutions of the United Nations […] 
moral, material and any other assistance‟ to the national liberation movements in colonial 
territories.  
Yet, the UN Charter‟s purposes, set out in the Preamble, include the promotion of 
peace and security. Article 2 (3) and Chapter VI of the UN Charter require states to first try 
to settle a dispute peacefully. Accordingly, support by other states should be limited to 
humanitarian and non-military assistance.
242
 
b) Humanitarian intervention 
The concept of humanitarian intervention allows states to intervene militarily on the 
territory of another state for the purpose of averting great humanitarian crisis or 
catastrophe
243
 and protecting the life and liberty of the citizens of the latter state which is 
unwilling or unable to do so itself.
244
 However, humanitarian intervention continues to be a 
controversial concept and nothing in the UN Charter substantiates a unilateral right of one 
state to forcefully intervene in the domestic affairs of another under the guise of securing 
the implementation of human rights.
245
 Hence, humanitarian intervention would appear to 
be contrary to the prohibition of the threat or use of force in article 2 (4) UN Charter.  
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Proponents of humanitarian intervention assert, however, that the use of armed 
force in this particular situation is not directed against „the territorial integrity or political 
independence‟ of the target state,
246
 that an exception to the prohibition of article 2 (4) 
should be made whether on moral grounds or based on state practice or political 
considerations.
247
 Yet, under the UN Charter any use of force is prohibited, except in self-
defence under article 51 UN Charter or as a UN enforcement measure authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII.
248
 Hence, neither of the exceptions to the prohibition 




In addition, the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility
250
 imposed a ban upon the use of force as a counter-measure against 
international wrongs.
251
 This view is supported by the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case, where it held that unilateral resort to military force to ensure respect for 
human rights, although permitted under article 40 and 41 of the ILC Draft articles
252
, was 
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not an acceptable measure in the context of the Nicaragua case.
253
 Rather, it remained the 
exclusive responsibility of the Security Council to legitimize coercive measures, despite 
any defects the UN might suffer from.
254
 
Even if considerable international practice and opinio juris in favour of a right of 
humanitarian intervention existed
255
 so as to constitute a norm of customary international 
law,
256
 this would still not be enough to override the ban on use of force, which is a rule of 
jus cogens.
257
 A customary rule allowing unilateral intervention is insufficient to override 
article 2 (4) UN Charter.
258
 Moreover, deficiencies of the UN Charter, in particular those of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State 
to fulfill the obligation. 
Article 41 Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter 
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of 
article 40. 
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, 
nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further 
consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law. 
253
 „while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in 
Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect‟ – Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), (1986), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 14 at para 268. 
254
 „whatever be the present defects in international organization‟ – Corfu Channel Case, (1949) ICJ Reports 
4 at 29. 
255
 Eg India‟s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, Tanzania‟s 
intervention in Uganda in 1979, the intervention of North Iraq by Italy, the UK, France, the Netherlands and 
the US in 1991 – M Byers War Law: International law and Armed Conflict (2005) London: Atlantic Books at 
92 and Duffy (note 243) at 180.  
256
 However state practice has rather indicated insufficient support for a right of humanitarian intervention. – 
McCoubrey & White (note 57) at 117; I Brownlie „The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force, 1945-
1985‟ in: A Cassese The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (1986) Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 491-
504 at 500. This was the case, for example, in Kosovo. Russia, China, India, Namibia, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa were against the intervention, whereas the UK and Belgium tried to 
justify the war on the basis of legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention. It has been argued that SC 
Resolution 1244 retroactively authorized the war, however, this argument ignores the fact that the UN Charter 
desires rather a positive than a negative authorization by the SC. Moreover, the Kosovo crisis did not 
effectively change the law in favour of a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention since an occasional 
violation of international law does not change the rules of international law as found by the court in the 
Nicaragua case. – Byers (note 255) at 101-102. In addition, it is unclear whether a customary right of 
humanitarian intervention existed even in the pre-Charter period. And there is not enough evidence that such 
a customary right exists in today‟s state practice. – Beyerlin (note 244) at 213. 
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Advocates of human intervention further assert that the UN Charter also aims at 
achieving respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this context, they 
emphasize the importance of the Genocide Convention.
260
 
According to article 2 of the Genocide Convention
261
, genocide is one of the listed 
acts committed with the intention to „destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group‟. The acts include killing members of the group and deliberately 
inflicting on the group such conditions of life so as to cause its physical destruction in 
whole or in part and others.  
Yet, it is unclear what remedies are available to a state which desires to preclude or 
terminate genocide taking place on foreign soil.
262
 Article VIII of the Genocide Convention 
stipulates that „[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider 
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide [...].‟ 
Article IX of the Genocide Convention sets forth the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice for disputes with regard to the interpretation, application and 
the fulfillment of the Conv ntion. Hence, no state has the right to act alone or together with 
other like-minded states in an attempt to bring genocide in another country to an end.
263
  
Moreover, the competent organs to address the situation authoritatively and to decide 
which measures are appropriate are the Security Council and the International Court of 
Justice.  
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IV. Chapter III:  Consequences of a state of war 
In the past, the state of war implied full-scale hostilities, loss of lives and resources. 
Once recognized as such, a state of war led under international law to the application of the 
laws of war to the hostilities between the belligerent states, non-hostile relations between 
the states in conflict such as trade or diplomatic and treaty relations were terminated or 
suspended, relations between the belligerents and third states became regulated by the laws 




This Chapter will examine whether the legal consequences of a state of war under 
the modern law of armed conflict are still the same and whether it matters that a particular 
conflict is treated as war or not. 
1. The Laws of War 
It has been claimed that with regard to the application of the laws of war, it makes little, if 
no difference, whether a conflict is characterized as war. Common article 2 of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 stipulates that the Conventions apply to all cases of declared 
war and any other armed conflict between the contracting states even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them.
266
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Hence, the same body of rules will apply to the conduct of hostilities regardless of 
whether they are recognized as war or not. A declaration of war, on the other hand, would 
be significant in the case when there are no actual hostilities taking place
267
 and thus no 
armed conflict which would mean that the Geneva Conventions would not be applicable. 
If, however, one state declares war on another without undertaking any actual fighting, the 
Geneva Conventions will be brought into operation.
268
 
The existence of war
269
 would provide guidance as to the stages of a conflict in 
which the laws of war apply. The term „armed conflict‟ used in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 is not very precise. It might not include unopposed invasion or „peaceful‟ occupation 
although an extension of the applicability of the laws of war in this case would be 
desirable.
270
 For this purpose, Danish courts found that the Hague Regulations were 




A state of war would furthermore give more certainty of the status of military 
operations carried out according to the authoritative decision of an organ of the United 
Nations. Then such operations have to a certain extent an anomalous status. If they could 
be characterized as war, the laws of war would be applicable to them. Accordingly, in the 
instance of the Korean conflict, the UN Command as well as both North Korea and the 
People‟s Republic of China acknowledged the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the rules of warfare.
272
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It has also been suggested that some rules regarding economic warfare should apply 
only if a conflict is characterized as war.
273
 However, as far as economic measures which 
have been taken by one party to an armed conflict against the other one are concerned, state 
practice does not support the view that such measures would only be lawful if the conflict 
is being referred to as war.
274
 There have been several examples since 1965 when parties 
have adopted economic sanctions without any reference to war.
275
 Moreover, sanctions 
have also been deployed in disputes in which no party has yet used force.
276
 Hence, rules of 
economic warfare are not restricted to conflicts characterized as war. 
2. Non-hostile relations between the combatant states 
In the traditional view, the outbreak of war would automatically lead to the abrogation or 
suspension of diplomatic, commercial and treaty relations between the belligerents.
277
 This 
was not the case for hostilities falling short of war. Thus, it has been argued that 
characterizing a conflict as war was significant because it led to the rupture of the peaceful 
relations between the hostile states.
278
 
It is likely that a state of war would result in a rupture of diplomatic relations. If a 
conflict is treated as war, it is more likely that it is on a large scale.
279
 Hence, it is hard to 
                                                          
273
 Partsch (note 4) at 27; K Zemanek „Economic in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
band 3: Use of Force War and Neutrality Peace Treaties (A-M), (1982) Amsterdam, New York: North-
Holland, 158-163 at 158. 
274
 Greenwood (note 1) at 48. 
275
 For example, the sanctions by the UK in the Falklands conflict. 
276
 Greenwood (note 1) at 48. The Arbitral Tribunal in the Air Services Agreement case (France v. United 
States (1978) 54 ILR 303 (established by the Compromis of 11 July 1978; Riphagen, President; Ehrlich and 
Reuter, Arbitrators) found that a state is permitted to use countermeasures against an infringement of its rights 
by another state even if this would amount to an act otherwise prohibited by international law, provided that 
the retaliation is proportionate to the breach and within the limits of the law on armed force. – C Greenwood 
„The U.S.-French Air Services Arbitration‟ (1979) 37 The Cambridge Law Journal 233 at 237. 
277
 Oppenheim (note 7) at 301 (§ 97). 
278



















imagine that the parties would wish to maintain relations whose severance is less serious 
than the resort to war.
280
 
However, the traditional view that war suspended all treaties between the 
belligerents has been abandoned.
281
 
Even during World War II, (although an extremely special situation because of its 
atypical magnitude), evidence suggests that many fewer treaties were suspended than one 
might expect.
282
 With respect to American practice, there is no conclusive evidence that the 
United States regarded any treaty as terminated by World War II.
283
 Similarly, France 
shared the view, at least with regard to multilateral treaties, that in case the war had any 
effect on treaties, it was the effect of suspension, not termination.
284
 
Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
285
 provides that the 
provisions of the Convention shall not prejudge any question with regard to a treaty that 
may arise from the outbreak of hostilities between states. 
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The ILC Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties
286
 stipulate in 
article 3 that  
[t]he existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the 
operation of treaties: 
 (a) as between States parties to the conflict; 
 (b) as between a State party to the conflict and a State that is not. 
Article 2 (a) of the ILC Draft articles is in accord with article 2 of the Resolution of 
the Institut de Droit International on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties from 
1985.
287
 Treaties can only be suspended in the exercise of rights of individual or collective 
self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter insofar as the operation of the treaty in 
question is incompatible with the exercise of the right to self-defence.
288
 Article 7 provides 
for the continued operation during armed conflict of certain types of treaties listed in the 
annex
289
. Basis for the continued operation is their subject matter. 
                                                          
286
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its 63
rd
 session in 2011, submitted to the General 
Assembly as part of the Commission‟s report about that session (A/66/10). 
287
 Adopted at its Helsinki session in 1985, available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1985_hel_03_en.PDF (accessed 6 January 2012). See also art 5 and 6 of the 
Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties from 1985. 
288
 Art 14 of the ILC Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties. 
289
 Annex of the ILC Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties: 
Indicative list of treaties referred to in article 7 
(a) Treaties on the law of armed conflict, including treaties on international humanitarian law; 
(b) Treaties declaring, creating or regulating a permanent regime or status or related permanent rights, 
including treaties establishing or modifying land and maritime boundaries; 
(c) Multilateral law-making treaties; 
(d) Treaties on international criminal justice; 
(e) Treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation and agreements concerning private rights; 
(f) Treaties for the international protection of human rights; 
(g) Treaties relating to the international protection of the environment; 
(h) Treaties relating to international watercourses and related installations and facilities; 
(i) Treaties relating to aquifers and related installations and facilities; 
(j) Treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations; 
(k) Treaties relating to the international settlement of disputes by peaceful means, including resort to 
conciliation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement; 

















In addition, a treaty would remain operative, if it expressly provides so
290
, which is 
also foreseen in article 3 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on The 
Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties. 
An interesting comment was made by Malanczuk as to the view that armed conflict 
does not ipso facto terminate treaties. He argued that the rule has not changed, but rather 
the nature of the treaties to which the rule applies.
291
 While it was accurate to claim that 
war ended all treaties between belligerent states in times when most treaties were 
essentially bilateral contracts, the nature of treaties changed and many treaties became 




While Malanczuk‟s contention is debatable, the modern view is clear: the existence 
of an armed conflict does not ipso facto put an end to or suspend existing agreements.
293
 
With regard to economic relations between belligerents during war times, there seems 
to be no established rule in international law which precludes parties to an armed conflict 
from trading with one another.
294
 However, it used to be common practice.
295
 As a matter 
of practice, it is likely that states whose relations have deteriorated to the point that at least 
one of them proclaims war would wish to break off peaceful relations which is a less 
serious measure that the resort to force.
296
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 Yet a number of them may indeed lapse or be suspended on account of their nature, commercial treaties 
for instance. 
294
 Greendwood (note 1) at 49. 
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3. Law of Neutrality 
The term neutrality refers to the legal status of a state which does not participate in a war 
that has been waged by other states.
297
 Thus, a neutral is „a state which during the existence 
of a war is not a belligerent in that war‟.
298
 Under general international law, a state is 
generally not obliged to remain neutral but can rather enter the war on either side.
299
 
Neutrality creates rights and duties between the impartial
300
 state and the 
belligerents.
301
 States have to refrain from giving aid to the belligerents or furnishing any 
military supply.
302
 Neutral states are obliged to prevent passage of foreign troops or aircraft 
on their territory or of prolonged stay of the army of the belligerent states in their territorial 
waters.
303
 Activities of nationals of neutral states including carriage of contraband or 
breach of blockade are rendered unlawful by international law and punishable by the 
belligerent against whom they are directed.
304
 
The law of neutrality is based on two closely linked rationales: the principles of 
non-participation and non-discrimination. In particular, the first pillar refers to the desire to 
guarantee the neutral state that it will suffer minimal injury by reason of the war, whereas 
the second seeks to ensure that the neutral state will indeed remain neutral and will not 
assist one of the belligerents agains  the other.
305
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The law of neutrality is for a great part customary international law.
306
 It is partially 
codified in the Paris Declaration on sea warfare of 1856
307





 and the Helsinki Act of 1975
310
. In addition, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
also contain provisions relating to neutrality.
311
 
Generally, neutrality is contrary to the principle of collective security in article 2 (5) 
of the UN Charter.
312
 This is the result of the cumulative effect of article 2 (5) (in which 
member states undertake to assist the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance 
with the Charter), article 25 (in which member states agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter) and the provisions of 
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Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to enforcement actions.
313
 These provisions are 
supplemented by article 49 which provides that the members of the United Nations „shall 
join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the 
Security Council‟ and article 103 of the UN Charter which provides that all obligations 
undertaken under the Charter have precedence over any other international obligations.  
Therefore, if the Security Council has exercised its powers under article 39 of the  
Charter, third states may not remain neutral. Hence, the neutrality issue is only relevant 
when the SC has not taken action under article 39
314
 or when the determination of the 




An initial issue that needs to be considered is whether neutrality is incompatible 
with the UN Charter. It has been suggested that the rules regulating the behaviour of 
neutrals come into operation only in the case of the existence of a state of war.
316
 If war has 
ceased to exist as a legal institution, neutrality, whose applicability is assumingly 
dependent on the existence of a state of war, will necessarily have become obsolete as 
well
317
 or at least considerably restricted.
318
 However, as discussed herein, war is still a 
possible legal condition even after the adoption of the UN Charter. Hence, the concept of 
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In addition, if the Security Council is blocked because a veto is exercised, no 
obligation under the UN Charter would appear to arise.
320
 When the Security Council fails 
to take action, nothing in the Charter imposes a duty upon states to remain neutral.
321
 If no 
collective solution can be found, the law applicable before the UN Charter should come 
into play including the Hague Conventions of 1907.
322
 They are not precluded from 
entering the conflict, but they may not be compelled to participate by the contending states, 
and once they have declared neutrality, they are under an obligation to be impartial.
323
 
Moreover, the Security Council has only the primary, but not the exclusive 
responsibility for international peace and security.
324
In addition, even if the Security 
Council has identified the aggressor, it may, at least in theory, release a member state from 




Therefore, in the absence of unanimity among UN member states or when the 
Security Council has not called upon states to take military measures, neutrality, even in its 
classic sense, is possible within the framework of the UN Charter.
326
 
A contrary view alleges that there is no authority for this argument in the UN 
Charter. A retreat to neutrality by a member state would allegedly constitute recognition 
that the UN has failed as an organization and that neutrality was utilized as the only 
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 Moreover, it would amount to a return to the conditions in place before World 




In contrast, the opponents of this view assert that since the UN is not yet able to 
apply sanctions in all situations, neutrality should continue to exist.
329
 In the event that the 
Security Council should be unable to exercise its powers, the member states are not obliged 
to depart from the traditional law of neutrality which is based on abstention and 
impartiality.
330
 Only decisions of the SC are binding upon the members of the United 
Nations, according to article 25 UN Charter. Thus, under circumstances in which the 
Security Council is blocked, the traditional law concerning the rights and duties of neutrals 
would be in force.  
It has also been asserted that non-belligerent states can opt for a „qualified 
neutrality‟ on the ground that the historic notion of neutrality has disappeared with the 
renunciation of war as an instrument of international policy.
331
 Qualified or quasi-neutrality 
would refer to the case when members of the UN have become belligerents as the result of 
a decision of the Security Council. The non-belligerent members of the UN are then under 
a general duty to assist the UN and refuse aid to the aggressor. It is unclear, however, 
whether they should allow their territory to be used by the aggressor in the same way 
(equally) as by the belligerent states. It is probable that the non-participant states have the 
right to discriminate against the aggressor in such a case. Unless the aggressor would 
consider these acts of discrimination as sufficient to declare war, the non-participating 
states would remain neutral or quasi-neutral.
332
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Some writers suggest that the creation of a state of war automatically subjects states 
to the rules of neutrality unless they choose to engage in the hostilities.
333
 However, this is 
inconsistent with state practice. There are numerous cases in which states have voluntarily 
subjected their relations with the belligerent states to the law of neutrality.
334
 The law of 
neutrality was invoked on several occasions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, in 
1952, Arab states alleged that principles of neutrality had been violated in an agreement 
between Germany and Israel, according to which Germany promised Israel payment of 
reparations. Germany denied such a violation.
335
 
In the Six Day War of 1967, although France, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United States of America declared themselves neutral, they denied that any formal 
declaration of neutrality was necessary.
336
 Furthermore, in the Fourth Arab-Israeli War
337
 
West Germany and other NATO member states refused transportation of American war 




In addition, in the war between India and Pakistan from 1965, Ceylon was the only 
state to formally invoke the status of neutrality and refuse transit of war materials, whereas 
other states did not find it necessary to declare neutrality.
339
 
The Korean War was characterized by uncertainty with regard to the legal 
characterization of the conflict, but the law of neutrality was perhaps most consistently and 
pervasively applied in that particular conflict compared to any other after World War II 
until the mid seventies.
340
 According to the armistice agreement, which ended the 
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hostilities, a „Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission‟
341
 as well as a „Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission‟,
342
 were established. Hence, article 37 of the agreement defined 
the term „neutral nations‟ as including those nations whose combatant forces have not 
participated in the hostilities in Korea.
343
 This coincides with the view that in the post-
World War II regime, non-participant states are automatically to be considered to have 
neutral status. 
Moreover, in the Korean War, the traditional law of neutrality was invoked on 
many occasions. For the purpose of abiding by the rules of neutrality, United Nations 
forces refused to pursue belligerent aircraft over Chinese and Soviet territory on the ground 
that those states might have been neutrals and there is no right of „hot pursuit‟ into neutral 
territory.
344
 In addition, United Nations belligerents rejected a naval blockade of the 
People‟s Republic of China suggested by the USA. Notably, in the same proposal for a 
naval blockade, the United States themselves conceded that Port Arthur and Dairen, since 
controlled by the „neutral‟ Soviet Union, could not actually be subjected to a blockade 




Similarly, the Arab states and Indonesia did not allow the transit of United Nations 
forces and supplies through their territory claiming their duty of impartiality as neutrals 
forbade it.
346
  Furthermore, China tried to impose neutral duties under the Geneva 
Conventions to Japan when North Korean prisoners-of-war escaped to it.
347
 
The Vietnam War was not a declared war, but the United States insisted that all of 
the laws of war should apply to the conflict including the law of neutrality. In particular, 
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the United States accepted the applicability of the Geneva Conventions.
348
 However, only 
when Cambodia was invaded did the law of neutrality became of crucial importance. 
Cambodia‟s failure to prevent the use of its territory as a base by the belligerent North 
Vietnam was seen as a violation of Cambodia‟s duty to remain neutral and served as 
justification for the invasion. This can be seen as evidence that the United States regarded 
the law of neutrality as generally applicable to the particular conflict. However, Cambodia 
alleged to have declared itself by means of domestic legislation many years before the 
Vietnam conflict as a neutral state in any conflict that could occur so that it was 
presumably bound by the duties of neutral states in any hostility.
349
 
The aforementioned examples show that states have invoked the customary law of 
neutrality in a wide variety of armed conflicts since the Second World War. However, 
actual state practice also shows very contradictory application of the law of neutrality.
350
 In 
many cases, states did not rely upon the rules of neutrality even though they were 
apparently applicable; rather, they preferred not to take any legal stance at all. In addition, 
only in two conflicts – the Arab-Israeli and the Korean War – was the law of neutrality 
applied with any degree of consistency and comprehensiveness. In the rest of the cases of 




There are several reasons for this outcome. From an ideological perspective, it is 
problematic to claim neutrality if war has actually been outlawed and no longer exists as 
legal institution. Declaring neutrality would implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of an 
armed conflict, even though it might be deliberated by the United Nations
352
, but does not 
implicitly recognize a state of war
353
. Practical concerns include the argument that a 
declaration of neutrality by a state does not confer on it any additional benefits. Rules of 
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neutrality only regulate the commercial relations between the non-participant states as well 
as the relations between the belligerents and the other neutral states. However, in times of 
peace, states can protect their citizens and their interests as well as if they were neutrals in 
times of conflict if not better.
354
 
Hence, state practice does not give a conclusive answer to the question whether in 
case of a state of war third parties are obliged to observe the duties of neutrality.
355
 The 
examples rather suggest that the law of neutrality does not constitute a binding set of rules 
but is rather considered to be of a voluntary nature and applicable to any armed conflict, 
not just to wars.
356
 However, despite the discussed problems, which might give an 
incentive to ignore and avoid the law of neutrality, state practice shows that neutrality 
continues to operate in a considerable number of conflicts.
357
 
Thus, except for the case when the Security Council has determined the aggressor 
in the specific conflict and decided what measures should be taken, there appears to be no 
reason why a state that wishes to remain neutral should not be able to choose to adopt the 
position of impartiality. Moreover, this would not in any case lead to a restriction of the 
victim state‟s rights. Clearly, the victim of an armed attack is entitled to take reasonable 
measures in self-defence even against states not involved in the hostilities. However, it is 
very unlikely that self-defence would justify measures going beyond the traditional 
belligerent rights.
358
 Hence, in the absence of an authoritative decision by the competent 
organ, states can make their own determination as to whether to remain neutral or not.
359
 
Furthermore, the law of neutrality may be useful in establishing an upper limit to 
the rights of belligerent states.
360
 If a state party to the conflict takes an action such as 
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interception of a ship with a flag of a non-participating state, this would be an unlawful 
action under the law of neutrality and amount to an unlawful threat or use of force under 
the UN Charter irrespective of whether the state in breach of the law of neutrality is the 
aggressor state or not. Hence, it will be easier to determine the legality of such actions 
without necessitating a judgment about who is the aggressor state.
361
 
In addition, in times of an armed conflict, the purpose of international law should be 
to limit the scope of hostilities which is also the purpose of the UN Charter. The law of 
neutrality serves this purpose as well.
362
 
It is unclear whether a state which does not wish to engage in the hostilities but has 
not declared neutrality should be regarded as bound by the rules of neutrality. Some 
suggest that this would be the case only when the conflict amounts to war.
363
 However, it 
seems contrary to principle that the decision of one state to regard the conflict as war can 




Hence, instead of trying to argue that neutrality, like war, has become obsolete, a 
call for a renewed attention to the law of neutral duties should be made.  
In conclusion, resort to armed conflict does not, as it used to, oblige non-
participating states to choose between belligerency and neutrality. It may lead other states 
to choose to adopt the position of impartiality, but it doesn‟t have to since neutrality is 
brought into operation by the acts of the non-participating states, not the belligerents. Yet, 
due to inconsistent state practice, the law in this regard is far from clear. What is clear, 
however, is that the significance of state of war for the law of neutrality is doubtful. It is 
furthermore clear that one state may legitimately assist another state only if the latter is 
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acting within the law, for example by exercising its right of self-defense.
365
 If a state assists 
an aggressor, it acts in defiance of the law.  
4. Declaration of war 
Statements by a party to a conflict that it regards itself as being at war can constitute proof 
of a hostile intent.
366
 A hostile intent could be of relevance for assessing the legitimacy of a 




This argument was used by Israel when bombing Iraq‟s Osiraq Nuclear reactor on 7 
June 1981.
368
 Israel defended itself by contending that Iraq‟s claim that it was at war with 
Israel rendered an otherwise ambiguous action hostile and hence entitled Israel to act in 
self-defence.
369
 However, SC resolution 487 from 19 June 1981 strongly condemned 
Israel‟s action and found that it violated the UN Charter.
370
 
Yet, the approach could be of importance for assessing rights of states when responding 
to a series of „pin-prick‟ attacks in the following situation: when a country engages its 
regular armed forces in response to a series of guerilla attacks, it would be hard to 
determine whether they constitute self-defence or reprisals.
371
 If these guerilla attacks, 
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however, can be attributed to a country claiming to be at war, they could constitute an 
armed attack and therefore be legitimately met with force.
372
 
Even so, it should be kept in mind that these consequences would not likely emanate 
from a legal assessment of a situation as war, but rather from the factual declaration of war 
being a hostile action. Nevertheless, it is likely that a statement of war would only be 
issued after special consideration especially with regard to the fact that such declarations 
have become a rarity.
373
 
In addition, a declaration of war would make it clear that a new legal status has come 





. Therefore, the exact timing of the 
commencement of a war would be important for both individuals and the state.
376
 
Hence, a declaration of war might not be conclusive as to the existence of war, or in 
other words, the absence of a declaration of war does not mean that there is no war, but 
once furnished, a declaration makes clear the exact moment when a war has begun.
377
 
An unwillingness to admit the state of war might indicate a willingness to restrict the 
hostilities to the pursuit of certain objectives.
378
 Hence, operations could be restricted in 
their purpose or in a geographical sense as was assumed in the cases of the hostilities of 
1950-51 between the Chin se People‟s Volunteers and the UN forces in Korea; the 
hostilities in the Formosa Strait between 1950 and 1958; and the Suez crisis between the 
UK and France on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, in 1956.
379
 The disinclination to 
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recognize a state of war might also be indication for the refusal of one party to recognize 
the other as an existing state.
380
 
In contrast, declaring war has great importance for indicating what conduct might 
thereafter be expected of the participants in the conflict and of third states. In addition, it 





While war is a legal institution as old as states
382
, there is no unanimity among the 
international community as to a binding definition of war.
383
 It has even been suggested 
that each separate use of the term requires its own definition based on its particular 
purpose.
384
 Moreover, the existence of a subjective element, an animus belligerendi, as a 
constituent element of the definition, remains unsettled. As a form of self-help, war served 
as lawful means in the form of both a remedy for a wrong-doing and an instrumentality for 
bringing about a change in the existing law. Yet, international law sought to limit the right 
to resort to war.   
The first multilateral treaty aiming to limit the right of recourse to armed force was 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its articles 10 to 16 posed limitations to the resort 
to war, which served to outlaw war in certain specific circumstances only, but did not 
amount to a complete prohibition. 
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The prohibition of all wars of aggression came with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928. With this Pact, war ceased to be a lawful instrument of national policy for changing 
or enforcing legal rights with the exception of individual or collective self-defence.    
The prohibition of every threat or use of force culminated in article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter. Exceptions were made for legitimate acts in self-defence or for sanctions by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII. To date, all of these limitations and prohibitions have 
not been successful in preventing the outbreak of open wars or wars in disguise
385
, 
especially in cases when the Security Council has proven to be ineffective.  
Article 2 (4) prohibits the use, or the threat, of force between states. Both a 
declaration of war or actual hostilities would amount to a violation of this provision.
386
 
Rather than assuming that a state of war has been rendered obsolete, redundant or 
irrelevant by this provision, the more pertinent question is whether a declaration of war 
would be permissible for a state which has suffered an armed attack and would like to act 
in self-defence in response. Some writers answer this question to the affirmative without 
considering the limitation by the principles of proportionality and necessity. A further view 
argues that a declaration of war is permissible only if it constitutes a necessary means of 
self-defence. Finally, an alternative scho l of thought asserts that a state of war is always 
incompatible with the UN Charter and the membership of states in the United Nations.
387
 
However, it is not inconceivable that a declaration of war could be a proportionate 
measure of self-defence and thus compatible with the UN Charter.  This is further 
confirmed by references to a „state of war‟ in state practice, international instruments 
(including laws regulating the conduct of war), and municipal legislation.  Thus, even 
subsequent to the enactment of the UN Charter, war has remained as a continuing fact both 
in law and in reality.  
Yet, it is undeniable that not all armed conflicts constitute war. Hence the question 
arises whether there is any need to distinguish between „wars‟ and „conflicts not amounting 
to wars‟.  
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A state of war has important implications in some areas of domestic law, such as 
insurance
388
, contract and constitutional law.
389
 
A general reference to international armed conflicts ignores the important 
theoretical as well as practical distinctions existing between wars and other uses of inter-
state force short of war.
390
 It is likely that war entails the complete rupture of diplomatic 
relations and terminates certain categories of treaties between the belligerent states, 
whereas hostilities falling short of war do not.
391
 
A declaration of war will trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949
392
 even in cases where no actual hostilities are taking place.  
States may be called upon by the General Assembly or the Security Council to 
provide assistance to the victim state and to refrain from giving assistance to the 
wrongdoer.
393
 However, in the absence of an authoritative decision by the Security 
Council, neutrality continues to play an important role.  In this case, states are not obliged 
to decide who the wrongdoer is and to provide assistance to the victim.
394
 Accordingly, 
preventing other nations from joining the conflict should be the first prerequisite for 
effective UN peacekeeping.
395
 Recourse to force in self-defence is only an exception, not 
the rule of the UN Charter. Moreover, determining the identity of the aggressor may be 
difficult.  
Thus, the concept of war has not been made redundant by the UN Charter regime 
on the use of force. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the state of war might even 
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witness some revival in future years.
396
 War as a term has acquired over the years „deep 
psychological and emotional significance‟.
397
  
Hence, in recent years an attempt has been made to label the fight against terrorism 
as „war‟. The legal question behind it refers to whether the use of force could be extended 
within the framework of self-defence to military responses to terrorist acts, particularly 
since most such responses will violate the territorial integrity of a State that is not itself 
directly responsible for the terrorist attack.
398
 However, it is likely that these developments 
were influenced by the particular circumstances of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
399
 Thus, 
conclusions that any enduring change in international law has occurred are premature. It is 
for future state practice to reveal more.
400
 
To label the fight as „war against terror‟ may conform to a political analysis and 
have psychological advantages, but from an international humanitarian law perspective it 
inevitably implies conferring upon the terrorists an equal status, which criminals do not 
enjoy and should not have.
401




Not only has the legal state of war not become legally irrelevant to international law 
by virtue of article 2 (4) of the UN Charter,
403
 but, quite on the contrary, the state of war 
has become „more deeply relevant than ever‟ since the actions bringing about a state of war 
are now illegal whereas before the adoption of article 2 (4) UN Charter they laid within the 
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discretion of each state.
404
 In addition, the occasions and causes of war have not been 
eliminated by the introduction of the UN Charter regime. At most, the Charter regime has 
rendered as obsolete the notion that states are free to decide when to engage in war.
405
 
Moreover, since treatises on bodies of law such as the rights and duties of 
belligerents, rules dealing with prize, neutral rights and duties and military occupation 
continue to be written, it would be inaccurate to suggest that these bodies of law are 
already dead or inoperative.
406
 As long as important rules of international law (such as the 
rules regulating the conduct of hostilities) refer to „war‟, international law cannot dispose 
of the concept of war.
407
 
In this sense, the contention that war is irrelevant arguably provides a more accurate 
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